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EMERSON AND SANTAYANA ON IMAGINATION
H.G. Callaway
This paper examines Santayana on imagination, and related themes, 
chiefly as these are expressed in his early work, Interpretations of Poetry 
and Religion (1900). My hypothesis is that Santayana underestimates, in 
this book, the force and significance of the prevalent distinction between 
imagination and fancy, as this was originally put forward by Coleridge 
and later developed in Emerson’s late essays. I will focus on some of 
those aspects of Santayana’s book which appear to react to or to engage 
with Emerson’s views and aim to bring Santayana’s treatment of the 
theme of imagination into relation with Emerson. Understanding the 
differences in greater detail we stand a better chance of reasoned evalua-
tion of alternative conceptions of imagination. I will argue that the 
Coleridge-Emersonian conception of the distinction between imagination 
and fancy is a crucial element of the background of Peircean abduction, 
and in this fashion, contributes to the continuity of Emerson’s writings 
with the pragmatist tradition. Santayana, in some contrast, resists the 
pragmatic tendencies of Anglo-American thought; and his alternative 
treatment of imagination, in stricter contrast with the scientific and 
common-sense understanding, prefigures or reflects his more emphatic 
distinction of the ideal and the real, which made of Santayana a “philoso-
phical materialist,” as he purports.1 Though we may certainly regard 
Santayana’s conception of imagination as resisting the tendency to make 
the imagined better the enemy of the good, his approach invites, too, our 
contrary concern with melioration and pluralism. 
 This paper was first presented at the II. International Santayana Conference, Opole 
University, Opole, Poland, June 2006, and late at the meeting of the Society for the 
Advancement of American Philosophy, Columbia South Carolina, March 2007. 
1. Cf. Norman V. Henfrey, “Santayana, George” in The Encyclopedia Britannica (1999).
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1. Santayana and the Ordinary Language of Imagination
The English word “imagination” comes to us through Middle English and 
Middle French ultimately from the Latin verb “imaginari.” My Latin 
dictionary gives a noun, “imaginatio,” translated to English as “imagina-
tion, fancy.” These Latin forms, in turn, were traditionally used to 
translate a Greek word, “Phantasia,” from “phantazein”—to present to 
the mind.
Webster’s American dictionary lists three chief meanings.2 First of all, 
imagination is “the act or power of forming a mental image of something 
not present to the senses or never before wholly perceived in reality.” 
This first meaning emphasizes the connection between imagination and 
images, as we contrast images with discursive imaginings. Secondly, 
imagination is rendered by Webster’s as “creative ability” including the 
“ability to confront and deal with a problem.” A person of imagination is, 
then, in this second sense, not someone sitting by and contemplating 
mental images, but a person of resourcefulness: the thinking person or 
active mind. An imaginative person is thus one who engages our interest, 
for instance, by means of stories or accomplishments “that fire the imagi-
nation.” Imagination as creative ability points to new and engaging possi-
bilities arising in the face of recognized problems. The third listing, 
however, builds from the formation and contemplation of images into a 
broader sense: imagination is a creation of the mind; especially an ideal-
ized or poetic creation but including, too, “fanciful or empty assump-
tions.” We say to the child, frightened by shadows in the night, “Don’t let 
your imagination run away with you;” or “You are only imagining 
things.” This final sense of imagination harkens back to the translation of 
the Latin “imaginatio” as both “imagination” and “fancy.”
There is a clear sense in which Santayana is a great advocate of imagi-
nation. Our initial problem is to try to understand what sense of imagina-
tion he is employing or advocating in particular contexts of discussion; 
and for that purpose, I have gone over the meaning of the English word in 
some detail. All the elements of common usage are present in Santa-
yana’s early book, and the chief problem is to see how the configuration 
of these elements figures into his arguments. 
2. See The Merriam-Webster Collegiate Dictionary, 1994. 
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In his Preface to Interpretations of Poetry and Religion, Santayana 
criticizes the liberal school of religion which we would expect to include 
the Unitarians: The liberal school “attempts to fortify religion by 
minimizing its expression, both theoretic and devotional,” he complains, 
and it “seems from this point of view to be merely impoverishing reli-
gious symbols and vulgarizing religious aims;” and in particular Santa-
yana charged that the liberal school “subtracts from faith that imagination 
by which faith becomes an interpretation and idealization of human life, 
and retains only a stark and superfluous principle of superstition.”3
Clearly, Santayana in this early passage, would have us dispense with 
the superstition while avoiding the impoverishment of religious symbols 
and religious imagination. We are not to fortify or strengthen the plausi-
bility of religion by minimizing its claims and expressions but instead add 
to faith that imagination by means of which faith enters into the interpre-
tation and idealization of life. I think we can see here already that 
concrete differences between religious traditions enter into Santayana’s 
conception of what to count as appropriate imaginative expression and 
interpretation. In the background of these comments we might expect to 
find something of Santayana’s perception and reaction to the compara-
tively austere visual forms of New England Puritanism and Unitarianism, 
in contrast with the richly colored devotional and decorative practices of 
the Catholic tradition. As in much of Judaism and Islam, the dissenting or 
non-conformist Protestant founders of New England typically rejected the 
aim of artful visual presentation of their ideals, and they are emphatically 
a “people of the book.” In order to focus on the Word, it was felt neces-
sary to remove all visual and imagistic distraction, minimize decoration 
and ceremony, and highlight the “good news,” the discursive message to 
be conveyed. Form follows function. 
There is something of a divide regarding religious aesthetics in the 
offing here; and concerning Santayana’s claims against the subtraction of 
imagination from faith, my inclination is to see him implicitly emphasiz-
3. Santayana 1900, “Preface,” to Interpretations of Poetry and Religion. (New York: 
Scribner’s), p. vii. Cf. the discussion of the religious imagination in Santayana 1896, 
The Sense of Beauty 47, “The Religious Imagination,” and especially the final pages, 
pp. 185-187, in the Modern Library edition. 
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ing the visual and imagistic in imagination as contrasted with the discur-
sive imagination and a more practical orientation. Consider, for instance 
the empty Calvinist “cross of the resurrection,” in contrast with the cruci-
fix, or a white New England, wood-frame meeting house in contrast with 
the Cathedral of Saints Peter and Paul in Rome. Certainly something has 
gone missing in these Protestant expressions, but it may be argued that it 
is not imagination itself which is missing, not imagination of the sort 
which can form and reform lives, it is instead a certain outward grandeur 
which has been replaced by the preacher’s and the congregation’s discur-
sive elaboration of the good news. The empty cross of the resurrection, it 
is said, is a symbol of hope and new life. Similarly, the simplicity of 
Puritan-derived architecture suggests that the Word, written and spoken, 
is regarded as more important and central. Yet whatever forms are felt to 
be more appropriate for religious expression, I think we will all agree that 
only a particular narrowness of perspective would prevent a purely 
aesthetic appreciation of the contrasting forms. 
In criticism of any positivistic account of society and religion in his 
Preface, Santayana certainly does make some room for the moral and 
more practical import of imagination. “The environing world can justify 
itself to the mind,” he writes, “only by the free life which it fosters there” 
(a profound comment, as I see it); and moreover, according to Santayana, 
“All observation is observation of brute fact, all discipline is mere repres-
sion, until these facts digested, and this discipline embodied in humane 
impulses, become the starting-point for a creative movement of the 
imagination,” which, according to Santayana, we are to understand as 
“the firm basis for ideal constructions in society, religion, and art.”4 Mere 
facts tell us little of interest except when understood “as conditions of 
these human activities.” The facts of nature and history only become 
morally intelligible or have any practically import, when understood in 
relation to creative movements of the imagination which enter into our 
constructions of the ideals of society, religion and art. There is a sugges-
tion of the moral function of the imagination, then, according to Santa-
yana,5 along side the poetic nature of religion, and when Santayana 
makes these kinds of points, we should take note that imagination seems 
4. Ibid., pp. viii-ix. 
5. Ibid, p. x. 
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less imagistic and more discursive. The theme of the moral function of 
the imagination even suggests more practical concerns insofar as the 
readers take ideals to have practical import. However, in light of Santa-
yana’s comments, neither should we be greatly surprised if the imagina-
tion of New England has had its own specific, historical and develop-
mental forms and direction. 
Santayana draws upon all the elements of our common-sense or ordi-
nary-language conceptions of the imagination, and if there is something 
distinctive in his approach, then this would seem to depend on the 
particular stress which he places on particular elements, say, imagination 
as related to images, in particular contexts or regarding particular themes. 
From what we have so far seen, one might suspect somewhat traditional 
or orthodox devotional practices as entering into his conception of the 
religious imagination. This seems to enter significantly into his opening 
criticism of “the liberal school.” Yet Santayana recognized the power of 
Emerson’s imaginative practice, and we cannot read his opening criticism 
of the liberal school into his criticism of Emerson. On the contrary, if 
anything, he exaggerates the Emersonian imagination, saying, of Emer-
son that “Imagination, indeed, is his single theme.”6 Santayana also says of 
Emerson that “Reality eluded him,”7 and this is a claim we need to review in 
light of Emerson’s anti-nominalism. 
2. Emerson, Imagination and Abduction
There is a significant philosophical conception of imagination in Anglo-
American thought running through Samuel Taylor Coleridge and Ralph 
Waldo Emerson. In comparison to the American dictionary definition of 
imagination, given above, the approach in Coleridge and Emerson 
appears to arise as a reaction against a stronger traditional association of 
imagination and fantasy. This traditional association is perhaps evident in 
the definition of “immaginazione,” given in some contemporary diction-
aries of Italian. “Immaginazione” is both L’immaginare and fantasia: La 
facolt di concepire nella fantasia e accostare liberamente: “the faculty 
to conceive in fantasy and with a free approach.” Though talk of imagina-
6. Santayana 1900, “Emerson,” in Interpretations of Poetry and Religion, p. 220. 
7. Ibid., p. 218. 
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tion invites the ideas of fantasy and fancy in English, as we see from the 
final element in the English definition given above, “fanciful or empty 
assumptions,” the differences in the definitions suggests something of a 
statistical difference between different languages in the corresponding 
usages of the specific elements involved in our notion of imagination. In 
spite of this, Coleridge himself, in sponsoring the distinction between 
imagination and fantasy, insisted that all languages contain some 
tendency toward expression of the distinction. Behind differences of 
emphasis on the particular elements of the ordinary notion of imagina-
tion, I expect we might find some difference in the relative influence of 
the ancient Epicureans and Stoics connected with contrasting emphases 
on the cognitive function of imagination. In German, the English word 
“imagination” translates most directly as a rather technical term, 
“Vorstellungskraft.” But since most of what we would ordinarily say in 
English using “imagination” would require something more colloquial, 
the burden of expression falls on the verb “vorstellen,” which literally 
means to place before, and is more evocative of mental imagings and 
material presentation or representation.  
“Fancy” and “fantasy” contrasts with “imagination” in Emerson’s 
thought, following Coleridge on this topic. While imagination builds on 
or projects “necessity” from what has gone before, according to Emerson, 
mere fancy implies an arbitrary relation or capricious departure. The very 
character of this distinction suggests culturally and philosophically 
specific roots of the philosophical treatment of imagination. In Emerson’s 
1836 Lecture “Modern Aspects of Letters,” he says of Coleridge: 
He has made admirable definitions, and drawn indelible lines between 
things heretofore confounded. He thought and thought truly that all confu-
sion of thought tended to confusion in action; and said that he had never 
observed an abuse of terms obtain currency without being followed by 
some practical error. He has enriched the English language and the 
English mind with an explanation of the object of philosophy; of the all 
important distinction between Reason and Understanding; the distinction 
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of an idea and a conception; between Genius and Talent; between Fancy 
and Imagination; of the nature and end of Poetry; of the Idea of a State.8
The passage testifies to the early influence of Coleridge on Emerson’s 
thought, and I have found good reason to stress the passage in several 
contexts. It suggests, too, some resemblance in their methodologies. 
While later Coleridge is associated with the romantic revival of the 
Church of England, since America has no establishment of religion, and, 
in contrast with Great Britain, is predominantly non-conformist Protestant 
in history and culture (Catholics make up about 25% of the contemporary 
population and Jews and Moslems about 2-3% each), Emerson is a quite 
“non-conformist” Protestant figure—though by no means orthodox in 
terms of any of our approximately 800 distinct Protestant denominations, 
including that of his own Unitarian background. Still, like Coleridge, 
Emerson was always interested in the reasoned revival of religious 
sentiment, and like Coleridge he is a reformer or meliorist, working in 
significant degree within and against the given background of the existing 
society and culture. 
There is certainly no lack of emphasis on imagination in Emerson’s 
writings. Emerson contrasts imagination and fancy perhaps most vividly 
in his Letters and Social Aims (1875): 
Imagination is central; fancy superficial. Fancy relates to surface, in which 
a great part of life lies. The lover is rightly said to fancy the hair, eyes, 
complexion of the maid. Fancy is a willful imagination, a spontaneous act; 
fancy, a play as with dolls and puppets which we chose to call men and 
women; imagination, a perception and affirming of a real relation between 
a thought and some material fact. Fancy amuses; imagination expands and 
exalts us. Imagination uses an organic classification. Fancy joins by acci-
dental resemblance, surprises and amuses the idle, but is silent in the 
presence of great passion and action. Fancy aggregates; imagination 
animates. Fancy is related to color; imagination to form. Fancy paints; 
imagination sculptures.9
8. R.W. Emerson 1836, “Modern Aspects of Letters,” in Whicher, Stephen E. and 
Robert E. Spiller eds. 1966, The Early Lectures of Ralph Waldo Emerson, vol. I., 
1833-1836. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press), pp. 371-385.
9. R.W. Emerson 1875, “Poetry and Imagination,” in Letters and Social Aims. (Boston: 
Osgood). To understand something of Emerson’s development from Coleridge, 
compare Coleridge 1817, Biographia Literaria, Chapter 4. 
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In effect, flights of fancy are here contrasted with the constructive, cogni-
tively oriented imagination. “Imagination is central,” says Emerson, 
while “fancy is a willful imagination” and sometimes “a play as with 
dolls and puppets which we chose to call men and women.” Imagination, 
in contrast, always relates thought to “some material fact,” it is “a percep-
tion,” according to Emerson, a matter of at least taking something to be 
true, since we do not affirm the perception that so and so, and at the same 
time call it an illusion, too. “Imagination uses an organic classification,” 
says Emerson, while fancy “joins by accidental resemblances” and “is 
silent in the presence of action.” From a philosophical perspective, as 
contrasted with that of literature as purely aesthetic interest, Emerson’s 
fully developed conception of imagination is a refinement of the 
common-sense notion which eliminates or sharply separates the element 
of willful fantasy, and it is a significant precursor of C.S. Peirce on 
abduction. The point is closely connected with what I have called 
Emerson’s anti-nominalism. 
For example, in his 1860 essay “Fate,” fate is understood as a matter 
of unalterable law. Law, whether scientific law of nature or moral law has 
always at least some tendency to execute itself. The self-execution of the 
moral law, is implied in Emerson’s theme of “compensation.” Implicitly, 
Emerson follows traditional definition: Fate is a power superior to the 
human will and operating in accord with arcane laws knowable only to 
the initiate.10 Though Emerson stresses the point that thought, as cogni-
tive accomplishment, makes us free, still, he equally emphasizes norma-
tive observation of laws of thought. “For if we give it the high sense in 
which the poets use it,” Emerson says, “even thought itself is not above 
Fate: that too must act according to eternal laws, and all that is willful and 
fantastic in it is in opposition to its fundamental essence.”11 From this one 
10. Compare the Italian: “Destino”: Potenza superiore all’umana volont che opera 
secondo leggi arcane e inalterabili; provvidenza; destinazione; fato (Finson 2005, 
Enciclopedia Multimediale); “Destino”: Potere superiore che talora sembra guido 
l’uomo indipendentemente dalla sua e dall’altrui volont; fato (M.G. Bacci 1993, 
Dizionario Della Lingua Italiana. Milano: Edizioni Polaris); “Destino”: fate; (futuro) 
destiny; “Era destino che accadesse” = It was fated to happen (The Collins Italian 
Concise Dictionary. London: Collins).
11. R.W. Emerson 1860, “Fate” in Callaway ed. Ralph Waldo Emerson: The Conduct of 
Life, A Philosophical Reading.  (Lanham, MD, University Press of America), p. 11. 
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may safely infer, I think, that the “organic classification” which imagina-
tion is to employ corresponds to those concepts required for and identified 
in ascertained law of nature, including, in Emerson, natural moral laws. 
Crucial in understanding Emerson’s perspective is to recognize that on his 
view, so long as we are subject to unalterable circumstance, and have some 
need to expand our freedom and power, there is always a prospective 
“higher law,” which we have yet to observe, recognize, or institute. It is this 
kind of point which made of Emerson an abolitionist. 
However we may be inclined to deal with the topic of Peircean abduc-
tion, what is central is the idea that we need some deeper understanding of 
the origin of reasonable hypotheses in contrast with wild guessing, and 
equally we have some need for comparative evaluation of hypotheses at a 
point short of their verification or refutation by empirical testing. Peirce 
proposed to investigate the logic of abduction, though I suspect there is at 
best a quasi-logic of the comparative evaluation of untested hypotheses. 
Peirce also claimed, in a very suggestive formulation that “The question of 
pragmatism is the question of abduction,”12 The point is of special inter-
est for our studies of American philosophy, if we are concerned to resist 
the tendency of the current revival of pragmatism to reduce to a disrepu-
table anti-intellectualism and “vulgar pragmatism,” which to use a phrase 
of Santayana’s, we might expect to be perpetually captured in the fore-
ground of experience. The crucial point is to understand how accepted 
laws or generalizations and concepts of a given field of inquiry may 
structure and constrain the formation and initial plausibility of new 
hypotheses in answer to outstanding problems of the field. 
3.   Santayana, Imagination, and liberty
Turning back more directly to Santayana, I would like to skip forward to 
writings of 20 years later, “Materialism and Idealism in American Life,” 
and “English Liberty in America,” which were published in Character 
and Opinion in the United States. First a passage concerning American 
12. C. S. Peirce 1903, Lectures on Pragmatism; [CP 1.196]: “If you carefully consider the 
question of pragmatism you will see that it is nothing else than the question of the 
logic of abduction;” and further “no effect of pragmatism which is consequent upon 
its effect on abduction can go to show that pragmatism is anything more than a 
doctrine concerning the logic of abduction.”  
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Imagination: “The American is imaginative,” say Santayana, “for where 
life is intense, imagination is intense also;” Addressing the future-
oriented character of American life, Santayana has it that if the American 
“were not imaginative, he would not live so much in the future.”13 What 
is the general character of this American Imaginativeness? Santayana 
answers in general strokes:
But this imagination is practical, and the future it forecasts is immediate; 
it works with the clearest and least ambiguous terms known to his experi-
ence, in terms of number, measure, contrivance, economy, and speed. He 
is an idealist working on matter. Understanding as he does the material 
potentialities of things, he is successful in invention, conservative in 
reform, and quick in emergencies.14
The imagination here attributed is not the imagination prone to forming 
mental images or contemplating abstractions, and it certainly will seek to 
exclude vain and fanciful ideas and ideals. What Santayana attributes is 
the imagination of practical resourcefulness, which, like Emerson’s 
account must, at its best, sharply distinguish between imagination and 
mere fantasy; just as Peirce, if we consider him as looking at abduction as 
a model of the scientific imagination, helping to distinguish genuine 
hypothesis from wild guessing, seeks to limit and focus us away from 
merely fanciful wanderings. 
It is not, then, a contemplative imagination which is to hold us 
engaged in the American world, but instead a more conservative and 
practical orientation to action, which finds expression in American 
pragmatism as in every-day life. In the end, then, we are faced with an 
important traditional question of American thought and civilization, “Can 
philosophy be practical?”—which we may now approach in something of 
the spirit of Santayana’s work. What are the appropriate philosophical 
principles of the philosophy of this life of the practical imagination? 
We do not expect any totalizing or apodictic answer in the style of a 
priori rationalism, of course. Yet at the same time, a philosophy there 
must be, a general way of thought, suited to stand substantially against 
the practical man’s tendency of intolerance and impatience with our 
13. Santayana 1920, “Materialism and Idealism in American Life,” in Character and 
Opinion in the United States. (New York: Scribner’s), p. 174-175. 
14. Ibid., p. 175. 
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philosophizing. Can we be both practical and principled? The practical 
imagination is responsible for engagement with life and the environment. 
Yet, on the other hand, it has its own general moral and social conditions. 
What philosophy will sustain the practical imagination and yet sustain 
itself and thus the general social and institutional conditions within which 
the practical imagination is free to operate? 
The practical imagination projects potentialities and opportunities, 
such as belong to the American style in the integration of immigrants, for 
instance. This cannot be a matter of mere images of opportunities and 
potentialities, a social bait and switch, or it will cease to be genuinely 
practical. What we imagine in any given case is free and cooperative 
activity. “The will is a mass of passions,” says Santayana in “English 
Liberty in America,” and “when it sets up absolute claims it is both tragic 
and ridiculous.”15 The philosophy suited to sustain the realm and reign of 
free cooperation is thus anti-absolutist and as a matter of positive policy it 
is fallibilistic. Those for whom a conservative and principled fallibilism is 
not sufficient as a principled policy simply demand too much. Though 
this may seem a harsh rule on occasion, as is the intolerance of intoler-
ance, it is a necessary rule of the freedom of inquiry. 
More generally, both science and human enterprize present to us ever 
new facts which we dare not ignore, and the process of moral and intel-
lectual adjustment to them, and evaluation of them, dare be no less 
persistent. From this perspective any purportedly infallible dogma, 
however dressed, is an impediment: the mere static image of final 
perfection which cannot effectively enter into our world of cooperative 
action except as a stumbling block. But that is far from saying that we 
cannot justly be more conservative about principles basic to our civiliza-
tion. In order to be more conservative regarding principle, we must look 
to living traditions of law, society and to established results of the diverse 
fields of inquiry. In Santayana’s account of “English Liberty in 
America,” there is both freedom and cooperation—and this significant 
combination demands much of the practical imagination and of principled 
action. It deserves a secure place in our philosophical practice as it does 
15. Santayana 1920, “English Liberty in America,” in Character and Opinion in the 
United States, p. 227. 
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in the wider world of human affairs. Being conservative on the principles 
of freedom is of the essence of political liberality.
